This article provides evidence that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate conforms to a four-year political business cycle such as the one hypothesized by Nordhaus (1976) but only when the incumbent party wins the presidential election. The unemployment rate, however, is only reduced by a cumulative effect of .3 to .6 percentage points in the two years preceding a presidential victory.
THE NORDHAUS-TUFTE THESIS
Nordhaus's analysis suggests a political exploitation of a short-run Phillips curve in which an incumbent president fights inflation with higher unemployment during the first two years and then fights unemployment with expansionary policies during the last two years. Although Nordhaus's international evidence was inconclusive, the U.S. data for shows that five of the seven election periods support the hypothesis of a PBC. The two periods for which a cycle did not exist also coincide with the incumbent party losing the presidential election. Tulle confirmed this conclusion for the unemployment rate during the 1947-1976 period, and presented evidence of a two-year congressional election cycle for the growth rate of real disposable income.
This hypothesis was formally modeled by McCallum, who tested the significance of six different electoral cycle variables (EV t ) in an autoregressive unemployment rate (U t ) model in the following equation:
where U t is seasonally adjusted data and n is chosen to ensure that e t is a serially independent white-noise disturbance term in the regression in which EV is omitted. A significant b 1 coefficient rejects the null hypothesis that no political business cycle exists. McCallum could not reject the null hypothesis during the 1949-1974 period and for other autoregressive-moving average models with seasonally adjusted and unadjusted data, and for a model that included administrative-specific electoral variables. McCallum (1978: 513) noted that although the tests were not exhaustive, the evidence "can only be regarded as unfavorable to the political business cycle theory."
The Nordhaus-Tufte hypothesis, however, implies that a political business cycle means electoral success while no cycle would mean political defeat. Such an interpretation suggests an alter-native test of the PBC. Therefore, WEV is substituted for EV in equation 1, in which WEV equals the EV cycle for the four years prior to a presidential election when the incumbent party wins, and is 0 for the four years prior to presidential election when the incumbent party loses.
2 Ten electoral variables (presented in Table 1 ) are tested for 1949/I-1984/ IV and for the following subperiods : 1949 /I-1960 /IV, 1961 /I-1972 /IV, 1973 /I-1984 /IV, 1949 /I-1972 /IV, and 1961 /I-1984 3 The sample period is truncated at 1960/ IV because Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 43-47 ) argue that no discretionary fiscal and monetary policy was pursued prior to the Kennedy administration and at 1972/ IV as a result of demographic changes in the labor force and the end of the draft.
THE RESULTS
The results for the unemployment rate indicate that WEV1-WEV7 are predicted negative sign and significant for 1961/I-1972/ IV, whereas WEV1, 3, 5, and 6 are negative and significant for 1973/1-1984/ IV for a onetailed test at the 5% level of significance. The electoral variables are insignificant for the other periods. The results are reported in Table 2 for WEV1, which was the most significant coefficient for the 1961/I-1972/ IV and 1973/I-1984/ IV periods. This is also the political business cycle variable that is most consistent with Nordhaus's original hypothesis. WEV1, however, is insignificant for the 1961/I-1984/ IV period, and a Chow test reveals structural instability for this period with 1972/ IV as the break point. 4 The instability is not surprising given the upward trend in the unemployment rate as a result of the demographic changes in the economy, and the existence of three recessions in the latter period versus one in the former.
